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Abstract
Among the many objections to Turkish membership in the European Union lie claims
that Turkey will be a powerful actor in the future EU, with a population as large as or larger than
Germany.  Many also claim that this power will have negative effects on the EU.  We examine
such claims analytically, influenced strongly by spatial models of EU policy-making.  We find
that Turkey’s preferences lie sufficiently outside the EU mainstream so that it will have little
influence in day-to-day policy-making under the assent, codecision, consultation, and
cooperation procedures (or the common procedure in the rejected constitutional treaty).  Its
influence may be more evident in areas such as the CFSP or JHA, where unanimity remains the
normal procedure.  Still, Turkey’s veto power here is no different from that of other, much
smaller countries.  Furthermore, veto power can only block changes and cannot be used to pull
the EU into undesirable new directions.  Even this veto power can be avoided if the EU-25
establishes whatever policies they desire prior to Turkish membership, forcing Turkey to accept a
fait accompli.   Despite these limitations to its power, Turkey may have some influence in purely
intergovernmental settings such as negotiations over new treaties that might occur some decades
hence. 
Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the European Union Studies Association in
Austin in March 2005, the Midwest Political Science Association in Chicago in April 2005, the
University Association of Contemporary European Scholars in Zagreb in September 2005; and
“Turkey and Europe,” Symposium of the Program on South Asia and Middle Eastern Studies,
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.1
Turkey has become an important political issue throughout the European Union. 
Opposition to Turkish membership was an important motive for the French to vote against the
Draft Treaty for a Constitution in May 2005, though as Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül and
countless commentators have noted, the two really have nothing to do with one another.  Turkish
entry has also become an important electoral issue in Germany, where Angela Merkel wants to
postpone, if not preclude entirely, Turkey’s entry into the Union.
As the French referendum shows, many people hold misconceptions about how Turkish
membership would affect the Union.  Many would be surprised to learn that Turkey has been
interested in joining the European Economic Community (EEC, now EU) since it applied for
associate membership in 1959.  Its 1963 Association Agreement included a promise of eventual
full membership.  Nonetheless, Turkey has since seen the EU grow from six to twenty-five
members, without itself becoming any closer to membership.  
To appreciate the length of this “process,” recall that Turkey’s first interest in
membership coincided with the UK’s original application, vetoed by Charles de Gaulle.  Or
imagine telling someone in 1959 that Estonia, then one of 15 Soviet Socialist Republics, would
join the European Union before Turkey could even commence negotiations.  The nature of the
discussion over Turkey’s membership has changed, but there can be no doubt that Turkey has
been part of political processes in the EU, broadly defined, for a very long time.
Of course, Turkish membership raises many issues not found in a post-communist
Estonia.  Harry Flam (2003: 7-8) argues that the most important reasons for the EU’s
unwillingness to negotiate Turkish membership over the years have been the budgetary
implications, the political implications as a result of Turkey’s size and likely voting weight, and“door toetreding van een land met 68 miljoen inwoners nu - en in 2020 83 miljoen - zal
1
ook de Europese Unie sterk veranderen.”
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the cultural question of whether Turkey is part of Europe.  Several other scholars have also raised
general concerns about Turkish voting power in an enlarged union, often using Shapley-Shubik,
Banzhaf, or other indices of voting power to reach this conclusion (i.e., Aleskerov et al. 2002;
Baldwin and Widgrén 2005).  Because Turkey is different from the European mainstream on
many dimensions, many EU citizens are concerned that Turkish membership could change the
nature of the Union.
Turkey’s potential political power is a major concern.  The standard refrain begins with
the observation that Turkey will soon have more people than Germany (see Müftüler-Bac and
McLaren 2003; Quaisser and Reppegather 2004 inter alia).  These concerns have entered popular
discourse–as The Economist’s “Charlemagne” (2005) notes, “By 2015 it will be larger than any
other EU state by population, which has unsettling implications for its voting weight and
representation in the European Parliament.”  Furthermore, this influence would supposedly
change the Union.   In a widely-reported speech at Leiden University, outgoing Dutch
Commissioner Frits Bolkestein (2004) joined many in saying that “the entry of a land with 68
million inhabitants—and 83 million in 2020—will also change the European Union greatly.”  
1
Matthias Wissman, member of the Bundestag since 1976, former cabinet minister (1993-98), and
chair of the EU committee in the Bundestag (2002-), fears that the EU will become ungovernable
(cited in “CDU/CSU setzen . . .”):
We have nothing against Turkey but we are of the opinion that the Union is at risk
of breaking if one stretches it too far.  When one makes it so big that it is no
longer governable, can no longer be efficient.  Turkey would soon be the largest“Wir haben nicht etwas gegen die Türkei, sondern wir sind der Meinung, dass die Union
2
kaputtzugehen droht, wenn man sie überdehnt. Wenn man sie so groß macht, dass sie nicht mehr
regierbar ist, nicht mehr effizient sein kann. Die Türkei wäre bald das größte Land der Union und
würde die Architektur der EU völlig verändern.”
Specific policies pose challenges, such as the working of agricultural price supports in a
3
country with a much lower price level (see for example Quaisser and Reppegather 2004).   The
EU’s December 2004 decision to begin negotiations with Turkey included recognition of Cyprus
as another policy issue that will need to be resolved (for review, see Forysinski 2005;
Müftüler-Bac and Güney 2005).
3
country in the Union and would completely change the architecture of the EU.
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Similar claims were made about the entry of the ten newest members, though they did not prove
to bar membership. 
On both analytical and empirical grounds, we will argue here that these concerns are
unwarranted.  Turkey is most feared on those dimensions where it is most different, but its
influence is smallest where it is the most different, precisely because of this difference.  One of
the most important features of EU decision-making is the presence of many veto actors and
supramajoritarian procedures, which mean that ideologically extreme proposals cannot be
adopted (Hix 1999; Kreppel 2002; Tsebelis 2002: Chapter 11).  Because Turkey will have
preferences outside the European mainstream on many dimensions, it will have little influence
over day-to-day policy-making.  Preferences, and not simply voting weight, determine influence.
In making this argument, we set aside many economic and social issues in the interests of
the narrowly political.  The economic consequences of Turkish membership have attracted
significant attention, though many of the effects of economic union are already available.   
3
Turkey and the EU enjoy a free movement of goods, and significant capital movement.  Though
the movement of labor is not free, there are already many Turkish workers in the EU.  Even
cultural integration has already begun, with Turkey a member of the European region in football4
and other sports contests, as well as being a figure in the annual Eurovision song contest.
Whatever one thinks of the economic or cultural issues, political decision-making
processes will be responsible for delineating future developments in both.  The bodies of the
European Union can encourage, influence, or reduce the significance of these other interactions.
For this reason, it is important to examine Turkey’s likely influence in the political processes of
the European Union independent of its economic or cultural effects.
History and the fears of Turkish influence
Turkey's relationship with the European Union needs to be seen in its broader historical
context, which illuminates the EU’s hesitance concerning Turkey and provides the background
for Turkey’s current preferences concerning EU membership and policy matters.  
Turkey’s desire to become a part of Europe has its roots in the 19th century and the
Westernization movement (for a summary of Turkish elite views, see McLaren 2000).  Starting
with the 1839 Tanzimat Declaration, the Young Turks and other Ottoman elites equated
modernization with Westernization (for a detailed account, see Ozbudun 1984; Shaw and Shah
1977; and for its economic underpinnings Ýslamolu-Ýnan 1987; Kasaba 1988).  Following 
World War I, the Turkish Republic was founded on the two pillars of Kemalism: independence
and modernization, with the latter referring to "development along the lines of the 'contemporary
civilization' of the West" (Sezer 1981: 3).  In other words, Turkey has been self-consciously
converging on European practices and preferences for a long time.
In light of this history, successive governments have regarded the EU as part of a larger
policy of seeking membership to all European institutions (Kabaaliolu 1999: 20)–Turkey joined
the OECD in 1948, the Council of Europe in 1949, and NATO in 1952.  The country saw the5
Treaty of Rome as another opportunity to this goal.  Important political figures such as Adnan
Menderes (Prime Minister, 1950-1960) and Ismet Inonu (Prime Minister, 1961-65) concluded
that Turkey should participate not just because of the economic opportunities but its political
potential.
Turkey’s application for associate membership led to an Association Agreement in 1963,
with an eye toward eventual customs union.  Under an Additional Protocol in 1970, a timetable
called for Turkey to reduce its duties on Community industrial products gradually over
twenty-two years, with the free movement of labor accomplished over twelve years.  The
Protocol nonetheless fell short of attaining Turkey’s principal objective of accession.  Even so,
this history means that some of the most controversial issues of the 2004 Enlargement have
already been addressed to a substantial degree for Turkey, reducing the gap between the two
sides’ interests.
The lack of further progress after 1970 was partly a result of political events in Turkey. 
Beginning in the 1950s, Turkey entered a period of boom and bust economic cycles,
accompanied by political crises that led to disruptions in the democratic system in 1960, 1971,
and 1980.  The import-substitution strategy of the 1960s and the 1970s had brought along
overdependence on imports and foreign borrowing.  After the oil crises of 1974 and 1979,
Turkish governments also faced severe foreign exchange shortages, leading to precautionary
rationing of some essentials (Onis and Webb 1992).  
Under such economic pressure, ideological radicalism turned into day-to-day violence. 
When the army intervened in politics again in 1980, in its role as"guardian of the Republic,"
Turkey's image abroad worsened again.  Following the dissolution of the Grand  National
Assembly and all political parties, the European Community froze its relations with Turkey until6
the resumption of democracy in 1983. 
In 1987, Turkey applied for full membership.  Since this application came after the recent
accession of Greece (1981), Spain, and Portugal (1986), the addition of another Mediterranean
country seemed plausible for both Turkey and the EU.  The Mediterranean enlargement also
made democracy and the respect of human rights an implicit condition for membership, and this
fact would become explicit conditions in the Copenhagen Criteria of 1993.   Turkey now faced
the prospect of joining a political union, not just an economic community, and the standards of
membership would be accordingly higher (see Müftüler-Bac 2003).
Despite these encouraging developments in the late 1980s, the EU put possible
negotiations with Turkey on the back burner with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of
the Cold War.  The prospects for Turkish membership were sufficiently weak that the 2000 Nice
summit did not even provide hypothetically for the number of future Turkish votes or members
of the European Parliament (MEPs).  Harry Flam (2003: 2) correctly notes that this “effectively
meant that the EU-15 did not plan for Turkey to become a member in the foreseeable future.”
Though less salient than relations with formerly-communist eastern Europe, the EU’s
relations with Turkey did progress in these years.  The long-planned customs union was phased
in over 1996-2001, making trade in industrial goods free from tariffs and quotas.  Turkey has also
followed EU economic policy toward many third parties, granting preferential tariffs to countries
in Central and Eastern Europe, the Middle East and North Africa and the signatories of the Lomé
Convention.
Despite this progress, hurdles remain.  Turkey is no longer applying to be one of seven,
but one of 30.  This inevitably dilutes its influence no matter how large its formal weight.  At the
same time, this larger union changes the political opportunities for Turkey.  Instead of being“In der EU-15 ist die Bedeutung der Kohäsionsländer (Spanien, Portugal und
4
Griechenland) relativ gering, obzwar sie im europäischen Rat überproportional vertreten sind. Da
fast alle Beitrittsländer im Vergleich zur EU relativ arm sind, wird durch die erste
Osterweiterung die Bedeutung der Kohäsionsländer deutlich wachsen. Sie werden ca. 30% der
Bevölkerung, jedoch 36% der Parlaments- und sogar 42% der Ratsstimmen auf sich vereinen,
doch nur ca. 14% des BIP der EU erreichen.” 
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markedly less developed economically as the rest of the Union, it can now join a coalition of
newer “cohesion” members.  In a major report, Wolfgang Quaisser and Andrea Reppegather
(2004: 80) argue that the first eastern enlargement can be expected to have major effects on EU
decision-making, and thus also change the environment for Turkey:
The importance of the cohesion countries (Spain, Portugal, and Greece) was
relatively limited in the EU-15 even though they were overrepresented in the
European Council.  Because almost all enlargement countries are relatively poor
compared to the EU, the importance of cohesion countries will grow significantly
through the first eastern enlargement.  They will encompass about 30% of the
population, 36% of the votes in the European Parliament, and 42% of the votes in
the Council, though they make up only about 14% of EU GDP.
4
Turkey, they suggest, will have an even greater effect.  With the addition of Bulgaria, Romania,
and Turkey, cohesion countries will make up 36% of the population, 41% of the votes in
Parliament, and 43% of the votes in the Council of Ministers, while contributing only 9% of the
EU’s overall GDP.  Turkey will be a natural leader of this group, with 14.2% of the EU’s total
population, 11.2% of the seats in Parliament, 7.8% of the votes in the Council of Ministers, but
only 3.0% of GDP.
Qualified majority voting, they argue, will make this group of poorer countries especially
influential.  A large, rich country such as Germany will no longer be able to block budget-busting
policies favoring poorer countries in agriculture and structural policy.   They go on to note the
likely effects on politics (Quaisser and Reppegather 2004: 80-81):
Though the cohesion countries will not have a majority in either the Council orZwar besitzen die Kohäsionsländer keine eigene Mehrheit im Rat und vor allem im
5
Parlament, doch über einen überproportionalen Einfluss (43% der Stimmen) können sie in dem
üblichen EU-Bargaining-Prozess ihre Interessen nachhaltig vertreten und gegebenenfalls
durchsetzen.”
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the Parliament, but because they have a disproportionate influence (43% of the
votes) they can continually represent their interests for a long time in the usual EU
bargaining process and achieve them should the need arise.
5
Along similar limes, Henry Flam (2003: 25) notes that “a coalition of poor, new member states
can easily block decision-making in the EU-28.”
Such calculations are not unfounded, but they are incomplete.  For example, QMV not
only reduces Germany’s ability to block policies that favor poor countries, but it also reduces the
ability of Turkey and other countries to block budget policies that existing members favor. 
Understanding the role of Turkey requires this kind of symmetrical analysis, as well as
consideration of the status quo (which may introduce some further asymmetries into the
analysis).  In what follows we will develop an analysis of Turkey’s likely role in EU policy-
making that will consider not just voting weight in the Council but the full panoply of EU
decision-making procedures as well as the location of the status.  Our analysis shows that the
many fears concerning Turkey’s future influence are overstated.
Concerns about Turkey’s preferences in Europe 
Turkey’s membership in the EU sparks concern in media discussion because it is
distinctive on at least two dimensions (see for example, The Economist, “Unwelcome Guests”). 
First, many claim that Turkey’s membership will increase the “Muslim influence” in the EU,
especially if a large, fundamentalist Islamic revival party one day governs Turkey.  A pro-Turkey
Danish editorial acknowledged that an Islamic revival party might pop up “like a jack-in-the-9
box” (“som trolden af æsken”) but argued that even a party based on Islamic identity politics
such as AKP (Justice and Development Party) could be strongly pro-European and reformist (“Et
større Europa”).  As it stands, Muslim influence in Europe is currently vanishingly small,
consisting of a few Muslim members of parliament in Germany and the Netherlands (and still
none in France).  It is hard to see how Turkish membership in the EU could increase this power
enough to make a difference for policy.  Debates over Turkey and Islam have raised the profile of
a few individuals such as (Ethiopian-born) Ayaan Hirsi Ali, but the effect on policy has been
trivial.
Against these fears, some expect positive effects.  Turkish membership may have a
“moderating” influence on Muslims currently living in the EU who might otherwise turn to
radical opposition movements.  The current government of Turkey argues that greater integration
between Islam and Europe will turn the issue of cultural difference into an advantage.  For
example, the government recently sent 700 moderate imams to Europe as part of a policy to
encourage moderate forms of Islam (Salhani 2004).  The AKP also sees the EU as useful for its
own identity politics, hoping that entry into the Union will eliminate the headscarf issue in
Turkey.  Such moves highlight Turkey’s role as a “bridge” between Europe and its neighbors in
North Africa and the Middle East.
A second concern about preferences is secular, an expectation that Turkey would tend to
join the peripheral coalition of the UK, Scandinavia, and most central and eastern European
countries (CEECs).  These countries are less strongly integrationist than the original Six and a
few other strongly pro-EU countries.  Moreover, this cleavage overlaps with many policy areas,
such as the role of markets or the EU’s relationship with NATO and the US, as well as style such
as the use of English as opposed to French.  Turkey’s effect on this debate should be a seriousWe are obviously following Robert Dahl’s (1957) definition of power as the ability to
6
get someone else to do something that they would not otherwise do.  Turkey is not powerful if its
votes are cast to keep the EU doing what it already does.
10
concern, and here Turkey’s votes could make a real difference.  Because this division already
exists in Europe, however, Turkey’s entrance would not change the terms of the Union but
merely contribute to the victory of one side or another in an existing debate. Examining the
effects of Turkey’s influence more precisely is our task in the next sections.
The dimensionality of EU politics and Turkey’s likely preferences
Given Turkey’s distinctiveness, our analysis of Turkey’s weight in the political
institutions of the EU depends both on voting rules and on preferences.  We agree with those
who expect that Turkey will formally have as much influence as Germany.  Yet we maintain that
these votes may not affect policy, that is, they may not give Turkey as much power as many
fear–nor as much as Germany.  We will focus on what Turkey can use its power for, and whether
it is likely to be successful in using its power to make the EU do things that it would not
otherwise do.   
6
Several different theories might help us evaluate Turkey’s influence in the future
European Union.  Scholars using power indices to measure influence would capture the large role
of Turkey’s voting weight and assign it a large power index number (i.e., Baldwin and Widgrén
2005; Hösli 1993, 1995, 1996; Lane and Maeland 1996; Thomson and Hösli 2003). 
Unfortunately, these approaches do not normally consider preferences but instead treat each
ordering of preferences as equally likely (Garrett and Tsebelis 1996).  With this inattention to
preferences comes a failure to include the status quo against which policies are voted. 11
The simplest way to incorporate both preferences and the status quo is an
“intergovernmentalist” theory of Council decision-making (i.e., Moravcsik 1991, 1998).  This
approach’s central claim is that policy outcomes reflect “lowest-common-denominator” (LCD)
bargaining, so the outcome will be whatever the most reluctant negotiator will accept.  This
implies that Turkey can serve as a brake on decisions when it is the LCD, but that it cannot pull
the EU off in new directions because other, reluctant members will prevent this.   
Despite some useful insights, intergovernmentalism remains limited in several respects.  
Intergovernmentalist theory rests primarily on the study of a few “grand bargains” in major
intergovernmental conferences (Anderson 1995).  While it can be criticized on empirical grounds
even for such cases (i.e., Sverdrup 1998), it is analytically and empirically dubious for day-to-day
decision making for three reasons.  Analytically, Council decision-making typically uses
qualified majority voting (QMV), which means that the LCD can be outvoted.  Even decisions
that apparently enjoy a consensus in the Council have been taken in the shadow of a possible
QMV decision.  Empirically, the theory lacks support where one would most expect it.  In the
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), for example, policy outcomes often lie closer to
median voter than to any LCD (Smith 2004).
Given these limitations of the alternatives, our approach is to examine the EU as a
political system (Hix 1999), emphasizing the formal institutions of that political system and the
way that each country’s politicians can pursue their interests within that system.  We give special
weight to the growing literature using spatial theories of politics to understand the EU (Crombez
1996, 1997; Hug and König 2002; Pahre 1997, 2001; Tsebelis 1994; Schneider and Cedermann
1993 and to some extent Schneider et al. eds. 1995; less formally, Hix 1999, Kreppel 2002).
Spatial theory explicitly includes voting rules such as QMV and allows for domestic political12
constraints to affect outcomes in ways beyond what intergovernmentalism allows (i.e., Crombez
1996, 1997; Hug and König 2002; Pahre 1997, 2001; Tsebelis 1994; Schneider and Cedermann
1993).  It leaves open some questions, such as where preferences or policy agendas come from,
but “constructivist” conceptions of these processes can help flesh the theory out when needed
(see Smith 2004; Sverdrup 1998 for examples).
The major divisions in EU politics fall on the left-right dimension, the pro- or anti-
integration axis, or represent particular national interests.  It is also somewhat likely that another
dimension, which has reflected environmental concerns, could broaden to include other
dimensions of alternative politics against traditional values, as is found in Eastern Europe.  (This
has become known as a GAL-TAN cleavage, referring to green-alternative-left versus traditional-
authoritarian-nationalist values.)  Some scholars have found additional dimensions for secondary
policy issues, such as a North-South cleavage over agricultural and regional policy.  These policy
dimensions are also related to some extent, and can be collapsed in some analyses (for recent
contributions to this large literature, see Aspinwall 2002; Hix 1999, 2002; Marks et al. 2002;
Marks et al. 2004; Noury 2002; Pennings 2002).
Simplifying, we can say that national interests often dominate policy-making in the
Council of Ministers, while the complexities are more evident in the European Parliament.  In the
Council, these national interests are often organized around the question of greater or lesser
integration.  Even if individual ministers have preferences shaped by their position on the Left-
Right dimension, it often plays better politically to defend national interests instead of taking
ideological positions that tend to divide the citizenry politically.  We will therefore analyze
Turkey’s preferences in the Council as if it were a unitary actor pursuing a more or less coherent
national interest.  That national interest will often make Turkey’s preferences an outlier.13
Like other large countries such as the UK and (unofficially) France, Turkey’s national
interest will probably not lie in rapid integration.  Unlike small countries that recognize a lack of
control over the outside world, large countries tend to place a greater value on the sovereignty
costs of deeper integration.  Turkey is no different.
Second, and related in part to its size, nationalism remains very strong in Turkey as in
some other large countries such as France, Poland, and the UK.   Though lacking the imperial
elements of, say, British or French nationalism, deep patriotism and a state-centered nationalism
have remained an essential part of the Turkish polity since the 1930s (Ergil 2005; Heper 1985:
144).  This nationalism has only grown as it was presented as an alternative to fascism in the
1930s and 1940s, to Marxism and theocracy alike in the 1970s, and in response to the terrorist
attacks of the PKK.  Though it has not presented itself as an obstacle to membership, this
nationalism is likely to make Turkey prefer slower integration once it becomes a member.
Third, Turkey has limited capabilities to implement decisions toward rapid integration. If,
like other countries, it prefers to commit only to those policies that it expects to be able to
implement (Martin 2000 but Mertha and Pahre 2005), this weakness in administrative
capabilities will also lead Turkey to demand a slower pace of integration, lest it be legally
committed to policies that it lacks the capacity to implement fully.
Finally, Turkey’s position on the European periphery also means that it will have the kind
of extra-European interests that also characterize the UK and Scandinavia.  Its regional interests
in the Middle East, for example, differ considerably from the EU mainstream.  Because of its
security concerns and approach to its own Kurdish minority, Turkey has advocated a strongly
centralized constitution for Iraq, in contrast to the more federal principles that most Europeans
support.  Turkey also has significant interests in Central Asia and has close ties with the Turkic-14
speaking countries of the region, ties not shared with other EU member states.  Turkey will also
share some interests with the other poorer countries of the EU on the North-South dimension, a
dimension that has historically been much of secondary importance in defining EU politics.
In contrast to the national-interest and integration dimensions of the Council, the
European Parliament is increasingly organized along the left-right dimension.  The party groups
are certainly organized that way.  This left-right dimension often coincides with members’ views
on greater or lesser integration.  Particular national interests also play a role in the EP.  In the EP,
Turkey’s preferences must therefore be analyzed in terms of party groups, as we will do below.
Finally, it is worth noting that the EU does not currently have either a “Christian” or
“Muslim” policy dimension in decision-making.  One might argue that it does have a “Christian
Socialist” dimension behind its concern for social solidarity and subsidiarity, and certainly
Christian Socialism has played an important role historically in the European Union. 
Interestingly, the European People’s Party (EPP) in the European Parliament has recently
admitted the Justice and Development Party (AKP) as an observer, despite the fact that several
EPP parties opposed opening negotiations with Turkey.  The decision was reportedly an easy
one, as "a vast majority of group's members agreed that the AK Party is very similar to most of
the Christian democratic parties in Europe and it is important for the group to have a strong
partner in Turkey," according to Robert Fitzhenry, spokesman of the EPP party group (cited in
Kubosova 2005).  This position represents a remarkable reversal since the EPP’s declaration of 4
March 1997 that “The European Union is a civilisation project and within this civilisation
project, Turkey has no place.” (cited in Müftüler and McClaren 2003: 23).
Some have expressed fears that a Muslim member would change policy dimensionality. 
It is hard to imagine exactly how this would work, however.  What EU issues, exactly, would be15
affected by the fact that most Turks are Muslims?  On some of the most visible issues involving
civil rights, such as women’s head scarves, Turkey’s secularist tradition turns out to be very
similar to France and different from more integrationist countries such as the UK or Netherlands.
It is hard to see how these kinds of JHA affairs might be organized into a policy dimension other
than the existing Left-Right dimension.
In summary, Turkey will likely want slower integration, less social policy, less
environmentalism, and more agricultural and regional policy.  Indeed, it has already sought
exemptions in some of these areas, including agriculture, environment, taxation, competition
policy, and transportation (“Turkey to ask EU for exemptions . . .”).  Agricultural policy will
pose particular challenges, in part because of the serious regional differences in Turkish
agricultural development (Demir 2005; Quaisser and Reppegather 2004).  Its overall position on
the left-right dimension is somewhat harder to predict in light of the collapse of the Republican
party and the current dominance of AKP.  However, AKP’s likely entry into the EPP helps
cement its preferences within the European mainstream.
As we will show, having a position closer to the status quo than the EU core on all issues
than the North-South dimension implies that Turkey may serve as a partial brake on integration. 
However, it will not play a role in leading the EU into new and possibly undesirable directions.  
Turkey and the Council
We begin our institutional analysis with the European Council, which remains the most
important decision-making organ for many purposes (Thomson and Hösli 2003).  It has the right
of initiative in a few issue areas such as enlargement.  With a sufficient supermajority, it can
always amend Commission proposals, and its approval (also usually by supermajority) is16
necessary for almost all forms of legislation.  We will analyze Council decision-making under
both unanimity and QMV rules.
The oldest decision rule, unanimity remains particularly important in treaty negotiations,
such as those at Maastricht, Amsterdam, or Nice.  In these settings, the veto held by a country
with outlier preferences can shape the result in important ways.  Even so, this veto power is
highly constrained.  It can only block actions and not take new actions.  Worries that Turkish
membership will lead to major new spending programs redistributing income southeastward are
therefore unreasonable.  
In addition, the EU-25 can take actions today in issue areas where they anticipate a
Turkish veto in the future.  For example, the EU norm against capital punishment would have
been impossible to create with Turkey as a member, given unanimity requirements in JHA. 
Recognizing this, the EU-15 established the norm before beginning Turkish membership
negotiations, avoiding any Turkish veto in the future.
Now let us consider Turkey’s influence under a stylized form of QMV.  The QMV
procedure requires a majority of about 5/7 of the weighted votes, which we will model with only
seven states.  Treating Turkey as one of those seven overstates its likely vote weight (29 votes
out of about 375, or 7.7%, which is a little more than half of one-seventh), and therefore
exaggerates its influence.  We will examine politics on a single policy dimension, which reflects
the stronger germaneness constraint of EU policy-making in comparison with the United States. 
This restriction does not model well those cases in which trade-offs across policy are important,
such as IGCs.17
Figure 1 shows this model, with the ideal points of seven EU member states shown on a
single dimension.  Before Turkey joins the EU, policy will lie in the “core,” which is the range of
policy from 3's ideal point to 5's ideal point.  Any policy to the left of 3's ideal point would attract
a QMV majority (3 through 7) to move it to the right, while any policy to the right of 5's ideal
point would attract a similar majority to move it to the left.  Between 3 and 5, three or more
players would block any move in either direction.
We will now add Turkey to this abstract model.  To do so, we will allow Turkey to have
any preferences at all, so that we analyze all the possibilities, whether likely or not.  These
Figure 1
Effects of Turkey on the Council Core18
preferences will likely be different from one issue to the next, so this approach abstracts from any
particular issue area.  We consider five possible locations for Turkey’s ideal point (labeled T1-
T5), exhausting the logical possibilities of types of effects in this model.  Because the line
representing policy space is symmetric, particular illustrations of Turkey’s location should not be
interpreted as implying that Turkey is on either the “Left” or “Right.” 
As we have stressed throughout this paper, Turkey’s influence is shaped by two factors:
its ideal point, and the weighting that its votes receive.  Adding an eighth player means that a 5/7
majority requires six votes of eight.  This case is illustrated in the bottom diagram, treating
Turkey as a “normal” country.  Alternatively, we might suppose that Turkey’s large weighted
vote means that a majority of five (of eight) countries can pass any proposal if that five includes
Turkey, while six countries are necessary if Turkey opposes the proposal.  In this way, we
capture Turkey’s relatively large share of votes in a simple way.  This situation is shown in
Figure 1 as “powerful Turkey.”  Obviously this procedure overstates Turkey’s real votes but the
distinction between the two scenarios is useful, and much easier to see when exaggerated.
This procedure works tolerably well for all foreseeable decision-making processes. The
EU Constitution, if it had been ratified, would have used a “double majority” vote requiring a
majority of 55% of member states representing 65% of the Union population, with a blocking
coalition also required to consist of at least four states.  If Turkey were to join the EU today, it
would have 70 million of the EU’s population of 550 million (including Bulgaria and Romania),
or about one-eighth of the total.  This would have an effect similar to the “powerful Turkey”
scenario discussed in the text, although reducing Turkey’s blocking power a bit because of the
four-state minimum requirement for any measure to pass.
Adding Turkey defines a new core–the set of policies that, once adopted, cannot be19
changed.   These cores are shown as C1-C5 for each of the five possible locations of Turkey’s
preferences.   The pre-Turkey situation also defined a core.  When those cores are identical,
adding Turkey has no effect, for whatever policy was in effect before Turkey will remain after
Turkey.  If the post-Turkey core is a superset of the pre-Turkey core, Turkey will again have no
effect, since every policy previously in effect would continue to be in the core and would
therefore not be subject to change (by definition).
When Turkey is a “normal” state, it can expand the core slightly when it has extreme
preferences.  We see this in the cores C1, C2 and C5 (C5, we should note, is the mirror image of
C2 but is included to show effects in both directions).  When Turkey’s preferences lie only
slightly outside the existing core, as is true of T2 and T5, it expands the win-set slightly to
include its own ideal point.  In contrast, when Turkey has extreme preference on a policy
dimension, it will always be outvoted.  However, outvoting Turkey requires that the policy
coalition add some other state to the winning QMV coalition.  This other country’s preferences
may help shape the win-set.  As we see in Figure 1, state 2 will help define the win-set in these
cases.
When Turkey is “powerful” in the sense defined above, it will not surprisingly have
greater influence.  Turkey’s influence in moving policy in a favorable direction works in exactly
the same way as a “normal” Turkey.  In these cases, Turkey’s votes can expand the core in the
direction that it favors; equivalently, it can keep the core from reaching too far away from its
preferences.
The more interesting effect happens on the opposite end of the policy dimension. 
Turkey’s weighted votes do not help much in pulling policy toward its ideal point but are very
useful when putting together a blocking coalition against policy changes unfavorable to Turkey. 20
A coalition of five states that includes Turkey can ignore the most distant three member states,
labeled 5-7 in our figure.  This pulls in the right-hand bound of the core, either to 4's ideal point
or to Turkey’s own ideal point.  This effect is visible in C2, for example.  
Even in these cases, Turkey’s influence is limited to new policy initiatives.  Any well-
established policy will already be located in the pre-Turkey core, that is, between the ideal points
of states 3 and 5.  Analyzing this requires a new concept, the “win-set.”  The win-set is the set of
policies that the Council prefers to a particular status quo.  This differs from the core, which does
not consider the status quo at all (or, phrased differently, considers all possible status quos, and
takes the union of all the resulting win-sets).  
Any policy that is chosen before Turkey joins will still be a rational outcome and
therefore not subject to change.  The CAP is probably a good example, which is very difficult to
change whether or not Turkey joins the EU.  We need only conduct a win-set analysis, then,
when the pre-Turkey core is not a subset of the post-Turkey core.  To see the maximum extent of
its possible influence, we will consider only the case of a “powerful” Turkey.  Figure 2 begins
with the assumption that the pre-Turkey policy is in that set of the core that does not lie in the
post-Turkey core (T5, which is the mirror image of T1, is not shown).  Below the pre-Turkey
core, we show this set of “changeable” policies, that is, policies that are no longer in the post-
Turkey core.  The policies in this set provide the possible locations of the status quo.21
To see the maximum change, suppose that the player farthest away can propose a new
policy–this means T1 or state 1 for policy changes to the left, state 7 for policy changes to the
right.  Any proposal needs to attract five votes if the coalition includes a “powerful” Turkey (as
in all the cases here).  For policy moves to the left, this means that the fifth actor from the left
must be no worse off under the new policy; for policy moves to the right, the fifth actor from the
right must be no worse off under the new policy.  The minimum change is infinitesimally small. 
Because the set of changeable policies is an open set defined by the boundary of the
“unchangeable” core, a closed set, policy could change by epsilon, bringing into that core.  The
Figure 2
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win-set consists of all points between that minimum and maximum (see Figure 2).
In all such cases, the new policy will remain within the old core, as all the win-sets are
subsets of that core.  The constraints imposed by the need to satisfy existing members limits
policy change considerably.  Turkey’s power helps determine the new outcome, but so does
existing members’ choice of status quo.  Indeed, the existing members can forestall any change
after Turkey’s membership by choosing the pre-Turkey status quo accordingly.
We would expect, then, that the potential for Turkish membership of the EU will shape
policy choices today.  This will be particularly likely in areas that are subject to unanimity today
but will be subject to QMV in the future.  This characterizes a variety of policies in the third
pillar (Justice and Home Affairs).  Turkey will not pull the EU in new directions after joining,
but its future influence will help existing members select particular solutions to problems in
advance of Turkey’s membership.  This is a much more narrow form of influence than seen in
most of the fearful accounts discussed above.
Further considerations in the Council
In addition to these vote calculations, let us consider two confounding factors.  First,
Stefanie Bailer (2004) has recently argued that differences in national bargaining “skill” also
affect outcomes in the Council.  For example, participants view the UK as very skillful
negotiators because of the high levels of information gathered through the excellent network of
British EU civil servants.
At this point, Turkey will not join the UK among the ranks of the “highly skilled.” It is
interesting that Turkish administrators have noticed the issue, however.  Turkey's former
Secretary-General for European Union Affairs, Ambassador Murat Sungar, has noted that he23
lacks sufficient numbers of expert officers in the core committee that will conduct full
membership negotiations with the EU (Kurt 2005).  This lack of skilled personnel remained a
problem for Sungar and, with the renewed challenges of the Cyprus issue, ongoing administrative
problems were a cause of his resignation in August 2005 (Boland, Kuser and Minder 2005).  
Turkey will doubtless fare poorly on the “skill” dimension until it has been an EU member for
some years and its professional diplomatic staff has had an opportunity to develop appropriate
expertise and networks.
Second, some scholars emphasize the importance of the unanimity norm in the Council,
which would make vote-counting exercises such as ours irrelevant (i.e., Mattila and Lane 2001). 
There is some tendency in such work to explain outcomes in terms of voting weights because of
vote-trading processes even under unanimity (i.e., Rodden 2002).  Unfortunately, we are not
aware of any studies that control for the status quo and the nature of QMV majorities while
simultaneously examining the role of voting weights, which is what spatial theory would have us
do (see Pahre 2005 for the general critique).  Some results are suggestive, however.  Harry Flam
(2003: 26), for example, finds that per capita GNP, Cohesion Fund status, and voting weight
explain variation in per capita contributions among the EU-15.  However, voting weight has the
smallest substantive effect and is of marginal statistical importance.  This is consistent with the
theory here, which would predict that controlling for the status quo and the QMV coalitions
would increase the measurable effect of voting weight.
We should also consider the likely effect of Turkey’s first Council Presidency.   The
theoretical literature on the institution of the presidency is still thin, but it seems that the holders
of this office does have some ability to affect policy outcomes in their favor (Huelshoff 2002;
Kollman 2003; Tallberg 2004).  Both experience in EU policy-making, and thorough preparation24
for the presidency play an important role in determining just how much influence the chair can
have.  Skill in brokering deals also helps shape the scope for a country to achieve its own goals as
part of the package.  There is no reason to believe that Turkey will be any more effective than
other states in pursuing its own national goals while Council President, and in its first Presidency
a lack of infrastructure and experience will likely make it somewhat less effective.
Looking even further ahead, we should also consider how the Council might change in
response to Turkish membership.  Carubba and Volden (2001) have suggested that the EU will
make greater use of smaller supermajorities as the number of members increases.  This implies a
greater use of QMV where unanimity now applies.  Despite rejection of the Constitution in 2006,
its “common procedure” may prove to be a desirable reform in future treaties.  Under this
procedure, most Council decisions would be made by double majority (55% of the countries
representing at least 65% of the EU population).  These kinds of procedural innovations increase
Turkey’s ability to influence new policies but reduce its ability to help block changes to existing
policies.
In light of our analysis of the Council as a whole, it is hard to see how Turkey could have
systematic and major effects on EU policy.  It can at best pull new policies in a favorable
direction, and can make some existing policies unsustainable by weakening some blocking
coalitions.  In both cases, existing members are hardly powerless.   By establishing a status quo
strategically, existing members can reduce even further Turkey’s likely influence.  This is exactly
how members have dealt with previous major expansions, by establishing the Common Fisheries
Policy before the 1973 enlargement, or by changing decision-making procedures before the 2004
enlargement.  We should expect the same behavior before Turkey becomes a member.25
Turkey and the Commission
The Commission is probably the EU’s second-most influential body after the Council. 
Like the Council, it has a voice on every issue, though Commission powers are slowly being
whittled away.  Each Commissioner has important agenda-setting powers in his or her policy
domain.  A Commission can also influence important policy decisions across issues by voting in
the Commission, though traditions of deference and consensus dilute this influence.
In this setting, Turkey’s first Commissioner will certainly be an influential figure in
Europe.  As a large country, Turkey will expect that its Commissioner will be given an important
portfolio.  Countries clearly choose their commissioner candidates carefully so that they will be
qualified for an important post.  Austria has chosen particularly well for a small country, winning
first Agriculture and then External Relations in successive Commissions (1999-2004, 2004-
2009), thanks to the European-wide reputations of their nominees (Franz Fischler and Benita
Ferrero-Waldner).  Poland has also played this game well, winning the important post of
Regional Policy for Danuta Hübner, an academic-turned-politician who has had positions at
universities in Berkeley, Madrid, and Sussex.  
When countries fail to select wisely, the Commission President now feels sufficiently
strong to relegate such a weak candidate to a secondary post.  The recent precedent was Jacques
Chirac’s choice of Jacques Barrot in 2004, despite his legal problems and involvement in
scandal.  Commission President Barroso assigned Barrot to Transportation instead of
Competition or a other influential economic post as France had sought.
Knowing this, Turkey will be highly constrained to choose a safe pair of hands.  Given
the uncertainties surrounding Turkey’s first commissioner, any future Commission President will
certainly not appoint the Turkish Commissioner to a post such as External Relations where26
significant discretion is essential to the job.  Nor will the President want to offend Turkey with a
minor post such as Information Society.  It would likely be very difficult to appoint a Turkish
commissioner to a post where Turkey’s preferences are significantly different from the European
mainstream, such as regional policy, culture, or perhaps agriculture.  
Given this, it seems likely that some significant economic post would be a likely
destination for Turkey’s first commissioner.  Knowing this, Turkey would be wise to nominate a
commissioner with significant international economic expertise, such as past experience with the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Trade Organization (WTO), or similar body.  This
background would imply that this commissioner would have preferences that lie within the
mainstream economic policy approaches found in the industrialized democracies.  If this decision
were made today, the set of likely candidates would include as Kemal Unakitan (Minister of
Finance), Ali Babacan (Minister of State), Abdullah Gul (Minister of Foreign Affairs) or Sureyya
Serdengecti (Governor of the Central Bank).   Each would pose a different set of political choices
if the government were making this decision.  Unakitan is an older member of AKP and is closer
to its traditionalists.  Babacan and Gul are younger and more moderate.  Serdengecti is a popular
figure because of his successful management of the Central Bank, and he has good relations with
the IMF.  All these figures have degrees in economics, and Gul is an Associate Professor in
International Economics.  Another popular name would be Kemal Derviº, the former Minister of
State in Ecevit's cabinet, a former IMF official, and now head of the UN Development Program
(UNDP) though he is probably too much associated with the Left.  For a non-economic
candidate, Turkey might follow the lead of several accession countries and choose a diplomat
closely associated with the accession negotiations, such as former negotiator Murat Sungar or
current negotiator Ali Babacan.  However, this strategy seems to be more popular with the27
smallest countries in the EU such as Latvia (Andris Piebalgs), Lithuania (Dalia Grybauskaitë),
Malta (Joe Borg), Slovakia (Ján Fige¾) and Slovenia (Janez Potoènik), none of whom ended up
with a major portfolio.  Of course, the set of candidates will be different when Turkey becomes a
member some ten years hence, but the kinds of issues here will be largely unchanged.
An economic commissioner is also likely because these posts are both important and
constrained.  Any new regulations would have to go through both the Council of Ministers and
the European Parliament.  This limits the discretion available to Turkey’s first commissioner,
though he or she would still retain the important agenda-setting powers of the Commission. 
Finally, the constraints under which Turkey will choose a commissioner practically guarantees
someone with mainstream views.  If Turkey selects poorly, its candidate will presumably suffer
Barrot’s fate.
Turkey and the European Parliament
The final major political body of the EU for us to consider is the Parliament.  We will set
aside the European Court of Justice, despite its importance, because the secrecy around its votes
make it extremely difficult to forecast the role of a Turkish justice.
The first question is the number of seats that Turkey will receive.  In the past, the EU has
assigned voting weights to countries in a rank-order fashion, and not proportional to population. 
Small countries are overrepresented, and there is a norm for large countries to be treated
similarly.  For example, Germany has as many votes as does Britain, France and Italy in QMV
decisions in the Council of Ministers, despite being significantly larger in GDP and population. 
After reunification, Germany did obtain more seats in the European Parliament, though the other
large states have identical numbers of seats despite varying populations. 28
Given this background, it is likely that Turkey would receive the same number of seats in
the European Parliament as either France-Italy-UK or Germany.  Which of these two possibilities
occurs will depend on the realized growth rate of Turkey’s population and economy, and the
exact date of Turkish entry.  Either weighting is likely to persist even if Turkey’s population were
to become substantially larger than Germany’s, especially since Germany’s economy will remain
several times larger.  As a “worst case scenario” for Turkey’s alleged power, we will analyze
Turkey’s future influence under the assumption that it will have the same number of seats as does
Germany.
Despite this formal equality, Turkey will likely remain much less influential than
Germany.  Germany is clearly the most influential country in the European Parliament today, but
this does not simply reflect the size of its delegation.  More important, the political systems of
Germany and the EU interact in a way that increases Germany’s influence.
Politics in the EP is dominated by the party groups (Hix 1999; Hix and Lord 1997;
Kreppel 2002).  The most important of these are the Party of European Socialists (PES) and the
European People’s Party (EPP), which represent mainstream social democracy and Christian
democracy (conservatism), respectively.  Because many EP decisions require an absolute
majority of all MEPs, and not just a majority of those MEPs present for a given vote, mobilizing
these two party groups often suffices to guarantee passage of any measure.
Within these party groups, national delegations provide a key organizing principle. 
Positions are normally worked out in each national delegation, after which each party group
develops a common position.  In addition, European party groups have no way to keep national
delegations in line, though national delegations can keep their members in line in various ways.
Herein lies the German advantage.  Germany’s two largest parties are the SPD and the29
CDU/CSU.  The SPD sits in the PES, the CDU/CSU in the EPP.  Their size in Germany
guarantees that at least one of them will always be in government, and thus represented in the
Council.  Their size in the EP means that they are typically the largest national delegation in each
of the two largest party groups.  The key advantage that Germany has, then, is the existence of
two dominant parties in the domestic political system that occupy political positions at the heart
of the two largest party groups in the European Parliament.
Although Turkish politics now operates as a two-party system, Turkey is not likely to
enjoy such an advantage.  On the Center-Left, the high degree of fractionalization will make it
unlikely for Turkey to have much influence within the PES.  On the Center-Right, the increasing
rivalry between AKP and DYP (True Path Party) will likely divide AKP's votes in the next
elections.  These divisions will make Turkey’s EP delegation look more like France’s or Italy’s
that Germany’s or the UK’s.  This will reduce its influence considerably.
To see the importance of this particular combination of features, consider the other large
countries.  The governing party in Italy, Forza Italia, formerly sat in the Union for Europe group
though it has since joined the EPP.  The UE is a mid-sized political group toward the right end of
the political spectrum, consisting of a heterogenous collection of parties, including Poland’s
Prawo i Sprawied³iwoœæ (Law and Justice), Ireland’s Fianna Fáil, and French Gaullists.  This
group’s support is not necessary for passing most legislation in the EP.  Its modest size makes
policy leadership more difficult, and its heterogeneity makes it hard to unite around any measure. 
Being in such a group made Forza Italia marginal despite its significance in Italian politics.  This
structural weakness was the most important reason for Forza Italia to join the EPP instead.
Though they may come together in domestic presidential races, parties of the French left
and right are also divided.  Left parties are found in both the PES and GUE, right parties in EPP30
and UEN.  These divisions make the French delegation in each group relatively small for a large-
country delegation.  They do not help shape the caucus agenda to the same degree as the German
parties.
Britain’s two largest parties now share the same potential advantages of the German
parties in that Labour sits in the PES and the Conservatives sit in the EPP (they historically sat in
the European Democratic group).  During most of the time since UK membership, however, both
parties have had outlier preferences within these party groups, largely as a result of their internal
divisions over Europe.  Consolidation of the Blair wing of the Labour Party has made it much
more a part of the PES mainstream, increasing its influence accordingly.  However, the Tories
have moved in the opposite direction and become more strongly Euroskeptic.  This has had the
effect of marginalizing them in the EPP on many issues, since the EPP and ELDR represent the
political traditions that have historically been the most supportive of the EU.
MEPs respond rationally to their opportunities for influence in the EP.  One interesting
measure is the number of MEPs who choose to stay in Brussels for a second term.  Though only
about 30% of all MEPs plan a second term in the EP (or a move to another EU institution),
almost 58% of British MEPs, and 43% of German MEPs plan to remain, in contrast to only 28%
and 23% of Italian and French MEPs, respectively (Scarrow 1997).  These data tend to confirm
our claims that Germany and the UK are much more influential in the EP than France and Italy.
In light of this analysis, the key question is, then, where will Turkey’s MEPs sit in the
European Parliament?  On the Right, the governing Islamicist party (AK) was recently given
observer status in the EPP, despite the EPP’s traditional foundation in Christian Democracy. 
Prime Minister Erdogan has sought to join the EPP partly because the EPP’s conservative agenda
seems suitable for the party program of AKP.  The EPP has also been strongly pro-European, as31
is AKP–uniquely, for a religious party in Turkey.  Perhaps more important, Erdogan also sees
strategic advantages in this move.  The EPP has been one of the strongest opponents of Turkish
entry into the EU.  Erdogan aims to neutralize this opposition, since joining the EPP would make
it difficult for the Christian Democrats to reject Turkey's membership.  Recognizing this, the
members of the EPP are cautious about making any comments about the future of AKP's position
in the organization. The chairman of the German CDU/CSU in the European Parliament,
Hartmut Nassauer, has emphasized the reluctance of the EPP to accept AKP's request and
implied that AKP's position is not an urgent matter, considering the long road ahead that lies in
front of Turkey (O’Rourke 2003).  AKP's recently acquired observer status, despite this
opposition, shows that the EPP group would like to see AKP on their side in the Parliament
especially because of the accession negotiations that will start in 2005. 
The opposition party CHP (Republican People's Party) is a member of the Socialist Group
in the European Parliament (PES) and the Socialist International.  Although leftist parties were
previously skeptical about the EU membership—mainly because of the Kemalist principle of
sovereignty—in the last decade they accepted membership in light of the intergovernmental
structure of the Union.  As a result, they have accepted entry into the Union as one of the major
foreign policy goals.  In particular, CHP's supportive position depends on its long-term
relationship with the PES and the hope that integration with Europe will strengthen secularism in
Turkey (Hale and Avci 2001).  In fact, Deniz Baykal, leader of the CHP, asked for PES support
on Turkish membership, and assured the members of the group about the Turkish government by
emphasizing that AKP is a conservative party, not a radical one ("Baykal asks PES's support"). 
We can expect interesting changes to accompany Turkey’s accession process.  There is
some tendency for parties from an “unconventional” party system to assimilate to the more32
standard EU system as they work within party caucuses and develop joint programs with them. 
For example, Slovakia used to be characterized by a party system consisting of conventional left-
right parties and unconventional, “alternative” parties.  Around the turn of the century, one of
these alternative parties, Smer, found itself as the only significant party proposing any traditional
“leftist” policies.  As it joined the Party of European Socialists (PES) in anticipation of taking
seats in the European Parliament after EU membership, it began to assimilate to PES policies on
various issues.  It now approaches the model of a conventional social-democratic party.  In this
process it gave up other policies, including some of a somewhat authoritarian bent, to gain
acceptance in the EU (Uèeò 2004: 63-66).  The same assimilation has happened to other parties
in Central and Eastern Europe, and we can expect that at least some parties in Turkey will
undergo an analogous evolution.
The relative strength of these parties will also reflect the electoral system that Turkey uses
to choose MEPs.  The EU rules for electing MEPs require that each country use a proportional
system of some kind even if they use first-past-the-post (FPTP) in national elections, as does the
UK.  Most countries use a system of proportional representation (PR).  This requirement of
proportionality is quite flexible, and encompasses transferable-vote systems in Ireland and Malta
that work in some ways like FPTP, and like PR in other respects.
Turkey uses closed list PR system. The candidates are elected from 81 multi-seat
provinces with a party-list proportional representation system using the d'Hondt method, with
restricted options and a double barrier (at the local and national level).  In addition, parties must
have broad national support and cross an electoral threshold.  A candidate can only be elected if
the party (a) is fully organized in at least half of the provinces and one- third of the districts
within these provinces; (b) has nominated two candidates for each parliamentary seat in at least33
half of the provinces; (c) has obtained at least 10% of the valid votes cast nationwide; and (d) has
received, in the constituency in question, valid votes at least equal to the applicable simple
electoral quotient (EPIC Project).  Except the 10 percent threshold, Turkey will most probably
choose a similar system for EP elections. In that case, candidates from minority groups (e.g.,
Kurdish parties) might win seats in the Parliament.  On the other hand, since the Left has never
received more than 40 percent of the votes in Turkish history, leftist opposition parties such as
the CHP would most probably win seats only from their traditional strongholds (e.g., Izmir).  
While Turkish parties will tend to receive votes in line with their national-level support, it
is important not to view EP elections isolated from national elections.  Voters view EP elections
as "second-order" elections in which many of them punish the incumbents, or vote Euroskeptic,
rather than voting their normal party loyalty (Reiff and Schmidt 1988). In this case, opposition
parties would benefit from the electorate's psyche. In the Turkish context, we would expect
opposition parties on the Right to gain more than the leftist parties because of the
above-mentioned political structure. Although AKP is claiming a center-Right position, it is a
hybrid of several Right-wing factions including more traditional Islamist ones.  Hence, another
center-Right party like DYP or a nationalist party like MHP (National Action Party) might more
easily attract the reactionary votes in the EP elections. In sum, we would expect center-Right
parties including AKP to have more votes than CHP, and the CHP to win seats from its
traditional strongholds in the PR system.  This fragmentation on an otherwise-dominant Right
may end up resembling the pattern in France, whose EP delegation is relatively weak.
Our analysis so far suggests that Turkey’s influence will be particularly small in the
European Parliament.  This implies that Turkish MEPs will not play a major amendment role,
nor will they be key players in the budget procedure.34
We should also consider more informal forms of influence in the EP, such as lobbying of
MEPs by industry, labor, and other groups.  Because the EP is a parliament with low party
discipline, similar in many respects to the US Congress, lobbying has played a rapidly increasing
role as EP powers have increased since Maastricht.
We are not aware of any studies that look at how national differences affect lobbying, nor
do we know any studies claiming that certain nations’ interests are better achieved through the
lobbying process than others.  The literature does emphasize that both national and European
associations play key roles (Bouwen 2004).  Peak associations of labor and capital, and similar
economic associations, seem especially important.  Several recent studies, following
developments in the theory of lobbies in the US Congress, emphasize the powers of groups that
can provide important information to the EU (i.e., Broscheid and Coen 2003; Crombez 2002).
Turkey has several peak associations in which labor and business interests are organized. 
Among these associations, TUSIAD (Türk Sanayicileri ve Ýºadamlarý Dernei, Turkish
Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association) and TUGIAD (Türkiye Genç Ýºadamlarý Dernei,
Young Businessmen Association of Turkey) have been more active in lobbying for the accession
of Turkey.  TUSIAD's lobbying group has visited major European capitals before the decision
about Turkish membership in 2004.  They mostly made contacts with ministers, heads of state
and peer organizations (e.g., French Entrepreneur's Movement, MEDEF).  TUGIAD, on the other
hand, followed a slightly different path by joining the subcommittee meetings of YES
(Confederation of Young European Businessmen Associations), and following the matters
regarding the European Union and YES in Brussels.  MUSIAD (Müstakil Sanayici ve Ýºadamlarý
Dernei, Independent Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association), a Muslim and faith-based
association, does not actively lobby in Europe because of its members' skepticism about the35
possibility of membership.   It represents small and medium-sized firms in Anatolia, which
naturally tend to fear competition from European firms.
Major labor unions  in Turkey such as TURK-IS (Türkiye Ýsçi Sendikalarý
Konfederasyonu, Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions), HAK-IS (Hak Ýsçi Sendikalarý
Konfederasyonu, Confederation of Turkish Real Trade Unions), KESK (Kamu Emekçileri
Sendikalarý Konfederasyonu, Confederation of Public Employees' Trade Unions), and DISK
(Devrimçi Ýsçi Sendikalarý Konfederasyonu, Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of
Turkey) are members of the European Trade Unions Confederation (ETUC).  The ETUC
unanimously adopted a resolution calling for Turkey's accession to the EU in October 2004
(www. etuc.org).  This organizational unity on EU matters stands in contrast to their differences
at the national level, which include ideology, religion, and public versus private sector
membership bases.  TURK-IS, the largest federation, is also the most skeptic of EU membership,
while the religiously-oriented HAK-IS and leftist DISK both see the EU as a way to improve
social justice in Turkey.  Yet, the question of to what extent this support is a result of Turkish
labor unions' lobbying efforts remains.   
Given the lack of scholarship on national variation in lobbying success, it is hard to know
what these facts imply.  Certainly Turkey has an infrastructure of peak associations that can play
a role in the usual forms of interest representation in Brussels.  The relative fragmentation of
these associations will tend to make them weaker than those from countries that retain a unified
peak association structure.  Beyond that, it is hard to tell.
In summary, it is hard to see how Turkey might “punch above its weight” in the European
Parliament.  The reverse seems more likely, with Turkey’s MEPs and interest groups being
somewhat less influential than their numbers would imply.36
Dealing with Turkey’s accession: prior changes in policy and decision-making
Whatever Turkey’s likely influence over policy in the future EU, current members can
reduce it by taking some decisions before Turkish entry.  The EU has a long tradition of changing
its rules before enlargement.  This custom locks in some policy choice or decision-making
procedures that the new member or members would dislike.  For example, the EU-6 laid out the
Common Fisheries Policy before the expected entry of four countries with significant fishing
fleets (Denmark, Ireland, Norway, and the UK).  The connection was made remarkably clear
when the Six reached an agreement in principle on 30 June 1970, the day before the accession
negotiations began.  As a result, the CFP became part of acquis communautaire that the new
members would have to accept, though this agreement did not become finalized for some months
thereafter (Franchino and Rahming 2003).
The Nice treaty reflected similar intentions in that it changed policy before the Eastern
enlargement.  Despite its ostensible goal of streamlining decision-making in a Union of 25, it did
not introduce majority voting in taxation, social policy, immigration, or structural spending,
where existing members would want to have vetoes against changes reflecting the interests of the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs).  Structural policy will be subject to QMV in
2007 but only on condition that the next seven-year budget framework has already been agreed,
thereby shifting the effective use of QMV in structural policy to 2014, well beyond current
decision-makers’ time horizons (Heinemann 2002).
Changes in decision-making procedures provide another example.  Though the Czech
Republic is more populous than Belgium, it received fewer seats in the EP (20 against 22), and
the same pattern characterizes Hungary and Portugal.  Nice also introduced rules for enhanced
cooperation by eight or more members.  This keeps the new CEEC members from blocking37
deeper cooperation whenever the EU15 wants it (Heinemann 2002).  These provisions will have
similar effects on Turkey, preventing it from using its potential weight in a way that would harm
existing members.
The accession negotiations can also lock in policies on certain issues.  For example,
several areas in which Turkish jurisprudence differs from general EU practice have already been
made part of the entry package.  These include abolition of the death penalty, and minority rights
for Kurds, a de facto prohibition on the introduction of laws on adultery.  The EU-25 and EU-27
can, and doubtless will, add other requirements as they wish.  We analyzed the logic of this
above, showing that this is an effective way to minimize Turkey’s post-accession influence,
albeit by anticipating that influence a bit before membership.
As Munchau (2004) has argued, the real question is not whether Turkey will join the EU
but what kind of Europe Turkey will join.  The EU’s current members have every interest in
making that Europe serve their interests, even at the expense of Turkey’s.
Conclusion
We have argued that Turkey’s room for influencing the EU is surprisingly narrow, despite
the many worries to the contrary.  In retrospect, this should not be too surprising.  The many veto
players in EU decision-making make it difficult to change policy.  The mere fact that normal
legislation requires approval of the Commission, Council, and Parliament prevents too much
legislation from passing.  This tricameral structure gives disproportionate weight to the status
quo, a status quo that Turkey did not help shape.  Moreover, the existing members can make last-
minute changes to that status quo before Turkey joins, diluting its potential influence further.
We should emphasize that our analysis here is partial.  For example, our analysis of“De Turken werden steeds verder teruggedrongen en het Midden-Europese keizerrijk
7
werd steeds groter . . . .Het territorium van de Donaumonarchie ligt nu verspreid over bijna
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decision-making procedures gives little attention to intergovernmental decisions that require
unanimity for the simple reason that Turkey does not raise any unique issues under unanimity
rules.  In an IGC, Turkey will have the same veto as any other member state, and one might as
well fear France’s continued membership in the EU as Turkey’s future membership.
In an environment emphasizing consensus, such as the Council of Europe or IGCs,
compromise is at a premium.  In this setting, Turkey may be able to trade its goals in some area
where they are outliers to obtain goals in some other issue area.  For example, it is possible that
some day the EU may decide to take a much more active role in some high-spending area such as
defense, education, or welfare.  Clearly, this would require a major new constitutional agreement. 
Turkey would likely have outlier preferences on these issues and demand much larger transfers,
and it would be in a relatively good position to obtain them.
As this suggests, like any other country, Turkey’s accession may present trade-offs
between widening and deepening the European Union.  Former Commissioner Frits Bolkestein
(2004) put such concerns in strong terms in a speech at the University of Leiden in September
2004.  He discussed the difficulties of integrating a large number of ethnicities and nationalities
into a single political system—choosing the provocative analogy of the Habsburg empire’s
attempts to build a multinational state in southeastern Europe after beating the Ottomans back
from the gates of Vienna in 1683:
The Turks were continually driven back and the Central European empire grew
steadily larger . . . . The territory of the Danube monarchy now lies spread across
fifteen different countries.  The empire expanded but the capacity to absorb the
new peoples declined.  At a certain moment the Danube monarchy reached the
limit of the number of peoples that it could hold together.   (Bolkestein 2004:3)
7vijftien verschillende staten. Het keizerrijk breidde zich uit maar de capaciteit om de nieuwe
volken te absorberen nam af. Op een zeker moment stuitte de Donaumonarchie op de grens van
het aantal volken die zij bijeen kon houden.”
“Hoe kan men stabiliteit exporteren en voorkomen dat slechts instabiliteit wordt
8
geïmporteerd?”
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Habsburg history, according to Bolkestein, illustrates a “consolidation problem”
('consolidatieprobleem’) analogous to Brussels’ problems now, torn between unity and diversity,
centralism and decentralization, absolutism [!] and democratization.  He reminds us that the
Habsburgs ended up giving Europe the first world war, and asks of the EU, “How can one export
stability and prevent worse instability from being imported?”   He concludes that the EU must
8
learn from Austria-Hungary, a comparison with which we are not inherently unsympathetic (see
Pahre 2001).
It is easy to talk about abstract problems of “consolidation” or “widening versus
deepening,” and we remain skeptical of the alleged causal relationships (see Pahre 1995).  A
closer review of decision-making institutions, Turkey’s preferences, and the status quo suggests
that the pessimists reach too far.  Like any other member state, Turkey will retain some scope for
influence.  However, its influence will likely be surprisingly small, despite the size of its
population.40
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